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We examine how the rising interprovincial migration of individuals with diverse ed-
ucational backgrounds affected human capital formation in China in the 1990s. We
find that gross outflow migration of those with higher and lower levels of education,
respectively, has human capital incentive and disincentive effects. Our estimates
suggest that the incentive effect eclipses the disincentive effect in general; however,
a surge of migration, particularly among less educated groups, implies more of a
disincentive effect in China in the 1990s. We also find that changes in the relative
labor supply resulting from net outflow migration mitigate a direct brain drain by
both encouraging and discouraging school enrolments.
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I. Introduction
There has been concern that the emigration of high-skilled workers from develop-
ing countries to developed countries would have adverse effects on the developing
countries and widen North–South inequality (Beine et al., 2001). Rich countries
hence become richer at the expense of poor countries who suffer as a result of a
reduction in human capital, or a ‘brain drain’. Since the 1970s, institutional set-
tings such as domestic labor market rigidity and fiscal and technological external-
ities have been studied to explore the negative welfare consequences of the brain
drain in developing countries (e.g. Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974; McCulloch and
Yellen, 1977). Later in the 1990s, further studies employing endogenous growth
frameworks reached more or less the same conclusion with regards to the negative
effect of the migration of highly skilled workers from developing countries (e.g.
Miyagiwa, 1991; Haque and Kim, 1995). These arguments start with a self-
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evident truth: migration inevitably alters the geographical allocation of human
capital. In this context, destination economies are the winner, gaining human cap-
ital embodied in migrants, and source economies are the loser, when, as is often
the case, people drained from the economy are highly educated.
However, since the late 1990s, a series of papers have challenged the pessimistic
brain drain argument, by suggesting that the emigration of high-skilled workers
from developing countries can be beneficial for the source countries. This claim
is supported by an important point neglected in the brain drain argument: a
country’s pre-migration human capital stock is endogenous to the prospect and re-
alization of migration. Some studies assert that there may be beneficial impacts of
international migration on source countries: that there is a ‘brain gain’, through un-
certainty in migration (Mountford, 1997; Stark et al., 1998; Beine et al., 2001,
2008), migrants’ remittances (Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Hanson and Woodruff,
2003; Borraz, 2005; Yang, 2008), return migration (Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996;
Stark et al., 1997) and migrants’ networks (Kanbur and Rapoport, 2005). These
findings suggest that source countries can alleviate the direct loss due to brain drain
by increasing human capital investment through a variety of channels.1
These new insights into international migration highlight the possibility that do-
mestic migration influences the total amount of human capital available at the na-
tional level as well as impacting the distribution of human capital across regions. If
migration does not affect the incentive for new human capital formation, migration
within a national territory, unlike the international case, would merely alter the re-
gional distribution of human capital in a country. However, this is not true when we
take into account the brain gain: internal migration alters new human capital in-
vestment and, thus, can change the overall human capital stock at the national level.
Because there are more changes of residence through domestic migration, domes-
tic migration can have a greater influence on new human capital formation.
The present study examines how the internal migration of individuals with di-
verse educational backgrounds affects human capital formation in source econo-
mies and explores the implications for the development of regional and national
economies. According to Beine et al. (2001) the prospects of migration foster in-
vestments in education when international migrants are positively selected based
on education and skills; we apply this conjecture to domestic migration. A better
chance of migration for the educated, who seek higher returns to their human cap-
ital in the destination, provides the younger generation with greater incentive to
enroll into schools in the source economy. Following Docquier and Rapoport
(2004), we refer to this beneficial effect as the human capital incentive effect.
However, we must be mindful of one point for our purpose: domestic migration
differs from international migration, discussed in Beine et al. (2001), in that those
with higher skill levels and education do not necessarily comprise the majority of
migrants. A higher prospect of migration for the less educated can have an
1 Docquier and Rapoport (2004, 2012) review literature on the brain drain and brain gain through
international migration, including recent empirical works.
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adverse effect on school enrollments because it pushes up the opportunity cost of
education. We refer to such a negative effect as the human capital disincentive
effect.
The goal of the present paper is to empirically investigate whether and to what
extent the prospects of migration for individuals with diverse educational qualifica-
tions reinforce and/or attenuate the incentive to attend school. We investigate the
case of China from the late 1980s to the 1990s and find both human capital incen-
tive and disincentive effects. The estimates for the positive effects are greater than
the negative effects, suggesting that, when people make their school enrollment de-
cisions, they tend to respond more to the prospect of migration with higher educa-
tional achievements to increase education continuance rates. However, it is shown
that the intensification of the interprovincial migration in China in the 1990s had a
rather negative effect on the whole, because the mobility of the less educated
workers grew at a much faster pace than that of the more educated workers.
An alternative theory of a mechanism through changes in the relative labor sup-
ply is also investigated. Net outflow migration of individuals of a certain educa-
tion level brings about excess demand for workers with the corresponding
qualification in the source economy and, thus, results in a relatively higher wage
premium for these workers. Assuming partial complementarities among workers
with diverse educational backgrounds, net outflow migration encourages school
enrollment in the corresponding schools and/or discourages enrollment in the
schools that provide a higher level of education. We identify both effects and show
that this mechanism alleviates the direct brain drain effect in source provinces and
contributes to stemming the tide of disparities in human capital among provinces.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the devel-
opment of mass interprovincial migration in China in the 1990s. Section III estimates
the human capital incentive and disincentive effects of gross outflow migration.
Section IV discusses relative labor supply effects and Section V concludes.
II. Interprovincial Migration in China
This section considers the evolution of mass interprovincial migration in China in
the 1990s. Data on interprovincial migration are derived from population censuses
conducted in 1990 and 2000. We use the numbers of migrants across province
borders and the numbers of those who remain, aged 17 60, who were not in
school in the census years to estimate migration rates.2 We estimate the overall in-
terprovincial migration rates as well as the migration rates categorized by educa-
tion backgrounds. Our sample comprises 29 provinces in China.3 Coastal
provinces include the 12 provinces of Beijing, Liaoning, Tianjin, Hebei,
Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan and Guangxi,
2 Details on the definition of migrant are discussed in Section III.
3 We exclude Tibet due to lack of consistent data, and treat Chongqing, which was a part of Sichuan
Province until 1997, as a part of Sichuan Province.
MIGRATION AND SCHOOL ENROLLMENT IN CHINA 173
© 2016 East Asian Economic Association and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd
and the other 17 provinces are inland provinces. The descriptive data on gross out-
flow migration rates by education category and by province appears in Table 1.
Over the past few decades, large and widening inequality in China has given
strong economic inducement for people to migrate from poorer provinces to
richer provinces. Since the Communist Party made a policy decision on reform
and opening-up in late 1978, China has undergone tremendous changes to be-
come the factory of the world. Rapid industrialization enlarged the disparities in
income between coastal and inland provinces,4 and deepening of reforms
4 Fu (2004) documents that the ratio of average GDP per capita in coastal regions to that in inland
regions was high, at 1.67, in 1990 and grew even higher, to 2.08, by 1999.











Beijing 0.836 1.446 4.332 0.894 0.780 3.794
Tianjin 0.533 0.650 4.551 0.722 0.746 3.323
Hebei 2.507 2.984 4.587 2.130 2.235 4.736
Shanxi 1.744 3.039 6.967 0.959 1.349 2.941
Inner Mongolia 1.556 1.737 3.272 2.155 2.258 3.937
Liaoning 0.639 1.59 5.285 0.697 0.975 2.839
Jilin 1.409 2.021 8.092 2.706 2.646 6.173
Heilongjiang 1.711 1.995 5.016 2.704 3.030 5.082
Shanghai 0.422 0.872 5.529 1.521 0.642 3.175
Jiangsu 2.082 2.313 8.360 3.014 2.403 3.824
Zhejiang 2.953 2.555 4.679 3.875 4.020 2.775
Anhui 2.097 2.100 6.596 9.022 6.287 4.766
Fujian 1.606 1.847 5.862 3.853 2.699 2.105
Jiangxi 1.392 1.767 5.839 15.933 11.263 9.508
Shandong 1.401 1.328 2.714 1.254 1.584 2.377
Henan 1.176 1.601 3.772 4.304 3.776 2.667
Hubei 0.728 0.988 10.499 9.356 6.348 6.821
Hunan 1.717 2.043 4.700 11.262 10.487 7.400
Guangdong 0.642 1.176 2.543 0.846 0.850 1.401
Guangxi 3.356 2.373 5.058 9.890 5.487 3.289
Hainan 1.989 2.869 4.735 1.853 3.066 4.545
Sichuan 2.712 2.447 6.539 11.348 7.453 3.640
Guizhou 1.844 2.193 4.558 9.884 5.338 4.486
Yunnan 1.195 1.693 2.949 1.701 1.442 1.674
Shaanxi 1.239 1.736 9.677 3.268 3.260 7.644
Gansu 1.865 2.608 7.455 4.317 5.149 4.853
Qinghai 2.751 5.370 13.256 4.258 6.250 10.769
Ningxia 3.687 3.177 5.594 1.578 1.502 4.396
Xinjiang 2.955 4.424 4.360 1.492 1.787 1.856
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substantially increased the dispersion of schooling returns across cities by the
mid-1990s, indicating a segmentation of the regional labor market (Yang,
2005). The uneven economic growth and returns to schooling have led to
increased interprovincial migration.
Under such circumstances, China’s unique household registration system,
hukou, has been relaxed to increase the mobility of workers. In addition, such
increased mobility was first observed disproportionately among the workers with
higher education. This, indeed, provides an ideal natural experimental case for our
purposes.
The Chinese Government introduced the hukou system in 1958 to limit mass
migration to cities and, thereby, ensure public order. A worker who planned to
move out from his/her registered place into urban areas and to take up
non-agricultural work had to apply through the relevant bureaucracies, because
those who worked outside their authorized domain or geographical area were
not entitled to receive basic social welfare, including food rations, health care
and education. However, the number of people allowed to make such changes
in their registration places was strictly limited and the beneficiaries were mostly
those with high educational backgrounds and skills, such as college graduates.
Thereby, the hukou system discouraged mass migration from rural to urban areas
as well as migration among cities, particularly from medium and small cities to
major cities, and, therefore, interregional migration has historically been tightly
constrained.5
Nevertheless, rapid and regionally uneven economic development boosted
interprovincial migration from interior to coastal provinces by the 1990s. As
economic development created strong demand for workers in cities and coastal
provinces, officials gradually started relaxing their enforcement of this registration
system and cautiously encouraging migration from interior rural areas. The
number of interprovincial migrants, excluding those who enrolled in schools in
the census years, tripled, from 8.8 million in 1990 to 28.5 million in 2000. Fur-
thermore, a clear pattern of migrant flow from inland to coastal provinces emerged
in the 1990s. Fig. 1a and b show that there is a striking asymmetry in the
development of mobility between inland and coastal provinces: the gross outflow
migration rate increased in inland provinces and the gross inflow migration rate
increased in coastal provinces. While interprovincial migration was less
widespread and moved fairly evenly between coastal and inland provinces around
1990, coastal provinces came to attract massive amounts of migrants and inland
provinces became the suppliers of human capital by 2000. In particular, inflows
of migrants were distinct in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong by 2000.
In addition, over this decade the interprovincial migration grew unevenly
among education categories. The national average migration rate for those who
5 Whalley and Zhang (2007) argue that hukou restrictions have played a significant role in
supporting inequality in China over the past 20 years.
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had completed high school, junior high school, and primary school or below,
respectively, increased from 1.9 to 3.8 percent, 1.7 to 5.0 percent and 0.8 to 2.3



























































Figure 1 (a) Evolution of mass migration in the 1990s (Coastal Provinces) gross inflow and
outflow migration rates for all migrants in 1990 and 2000. (b) Evolution of mass migration in the
1990s (Inland Provinces) gross inflow and outflow migration rates for all migrants in 1990 and
2000
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slightly, from 5.6 to 4.0 percent.6 The mobility of college graduates was
conspicuous and significant in 1990; however, this had changed by 2000. The
higher migration rate for college graduates in 1990 was presumably caused by
the discrimination in the registration system. Nevertheless, rapid and lopsided
economic growth in the coastal region provided overpowering economic incen-
tive for high school and junior high school graduates to migrate to coastal
provinces in the 1990s, and migration became more common for these less ed-
ucated groups by 2000. It is well-recognized that many unregistered migrants
in urban areas have faced barriers to educating their children and accessing
health care. However, high school and junior high school graduates have been
migrating interprovincially despite unfavorable treatment for many under the
hukou system.
Furthermore, we observe some asymmetry in the geographical composition of
migration among educational levels attained. Table 2 categorizes interprovincial mi-
grants by schooling into four groups according to the source and destination prov-
inces: migrants between coastal provinces (CC); from coastal provinces to inland
provinces (CI); from inland provinces to coastal provinces (IC); and between inland
provinces (II). While CC, IC and II accounted for approximately 30 percent of all
migrants in 1990, the share of IC grew substantially to 63 percent in 2000, which
is consistent with the findings of Lin et al. (2004). To be more precise, these features
were also valid for migrants who had completed junior high school and high school;
yet the share of IC for migrants with college degrees increased by only 10 percent-
age points. These findings suggest that,in the 1990s, the incentive to migrate from
inland to coastal provinces was greater for residents with educational backgrounds
higher than junior high school, and, in particular, the incentive was stronger for
those who had completed junior high school and high school.
Because the censuses define migration as a change in place of residence within
5 years, college graduates who grew up in province A, attended college in prov-
ince B and stayed in province B may not be counted as interprovincial migrants.
In contrast, those who grew up in province A, attended college in province B
and went back to work in province A are likely to be counted as migrants. The
provinces of big cities such as Beijing and Shanghai have disproportionately
greater numbers of higher education institutions. As a consequence, a non-
negligible proportion of college students are considered to have grown up in prov-
inces other than the locations of their colleges. Although colleges are no longer as
strongly concentrated in the big cities (the ratio of in-college migrants to the three
large cities of Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai vis-à-vis all in-college migrants sub-
stantially decreased from 67 percent in 1990 to 26 percent in 2000), the ratio of
college students from other provinces to all college students is non-negligible
and stable at around 20–30 percent. Unfortunately, the census data does not allow
6 In both years, migration rates were found to be higher for those who had attended educational
institutes higher than junior high school.
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us to trace how much college graduates stay in the provinces where their colleges
are located and how many move back to the provinces where they grew up. This
poses a caveat in analyzing the college enrollment rates and the migration rates of
those with college degrees.
III. Estimating Human Capital Incentive and Disincentive Effects
In the present study we aim to identify the effects of mass migration on new hu-
man capital investment in source economies. The case of China is explored based
on the understanding that rapid and uneven economic development accelerated
interprovincial migration, and there is a disproportion in the migration of individ-
uals on the basis of educational background. Because our goal includes clarifying
whether prospects of migration with superior/inferior education are accelerators
and/or hindrances of new human capital formation on the whole at national level,
we employ provincial-level datasets. With respect to rural–urban migration, de
Brauw and Giles (2005) suggest a negative relationship between migration oppor-
tunity and high school enrollment in 52 villages in four provinces (Shanxi,
Jiangsu, Anhui and Henan).
We examine whether there are positive and/or negative effects of gross outflow
migration on new human capital formation in source provinces. As outlined in the
introduction, gross outflow migration can have both human capital incentive and
disincentive effects: better prospects of securing higher income through migration
for the educated (less educated) increase (decrease) incentive to enroll in schools
and, thus, mass migration accelerates and/or hinders new human capital formation
depending on the educational backgrounds of migrants. A simple theoretical
model developed in the Appendix illustrates these mechanisms. To identify these
effects at diverse school levels, we estimate the following equation:
Table 2 Shares of coastal and inland provinces as the destinations and sources of migration (%)
Year CC CI IC II
All 1990 27.26 13.99 32.13 26.62
2000 18.30 4.47 63.44 13.79
College 1990 30.67 11.99 40.81 16.52
2000 28.76 7.45 49.78 14.01
High School 1990 27.28 15.96 31.48 25.28
2000 19.00 5.64 62.28 13.08
Junior High School 1990 30.08 14.08 31.01 24.83
2000 18.85 4.03 66.16 10.96
The shares are calculated by the percentages of migrants in the following four groups: CC, CI, IC, II.
CC, migrants from coastal provinces to coastal provinces; CI, migrants from coastal provinces to in-
land provinces; IC, migrants from inland provinces to coastal provinces; II, migrants from inland prov-
inces to inland provinces.
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EDUi;t ¼ β0 þ β1MIGOi;t˜ þ β2PCGDPi;t þ β3UNEMPi;t
þβ4NUMSCHOOLi;t þ γið Þ þ vi;t;
(1)
where EDU, MIGO, PCGDP, UNEMP, NUMSCHOOL, γ and ν, respectively, are
the education attainment rate, the gross outflow migration rate, the real GDP per
capita at 1990 constant prices, the unemployment rate, the number of schools
per unit of land area (10 000 km2), the unobserved province effect and an error
term. The subscript i refers to provinces. The subscripts t andet, respectively, denote
the census years (i.e. 1990 and 2000)7 and the 5years between census years and the
inaugural years of the 5-year periods considered in defining migration (i.e.
19851990 and 1995 2000). We include three education categories of junior
high school, high school and college,8 because the nationwide enrollment rate of
school-age children into primary school was high, at 97.8 percent in 1990 and
99.1 percent in 2000, and internal migrants in China tend to have attained an educa-
tion level higher than junior high school. We define EDU as the percentage of stu-
dents who go on to higher education institutions vis-à-vis graduates of primary
school. We estimate EDU from the numbers of graduates from and new enrollments
into relevant education institutions in year t based on the premise that a typical newly
enrolling student into an education category (e.g. high school) graduates from a
lower category (junior high school) in the same year. The education attainment rate
for high school (EDUH), for example, is computed as a product of the ratio of new
enrollments into high school to graduates from junior high school and the ratio of
new enrollments into junior high school to graduates from primary school. Note that
EDU is, thus, free of the bias due to the differences in the cohort sizes of different
ages, unlike the mere ratio of newenrollments into high school to graduates from pri-
mary school. As our purpose is to investigate the incentive to enroll in schools when
people observe difference in the prospects of migration on the basis of educational
background, we consider working-age migrants and non-migrants in constructing
MIGO. To be exact, we pick out non-student migrants and non-migrants aged
1760 in census years by ruling out younger migrants aged under 17 who did
not graduate from primary schools 5years previously (1985/1995) and older mi-
grants aged above 60. Migration is defined as a change of residence within 5years
determined from the dates of population censuses, which are 1 July 1990 and 1
November 2000.9 Specifically, both censuses count a person as a migrant when
he/she changes his/her residence together with his/her registration. When a person
changes his/her residence without changing his/her registration, he/she is counted
as a migrant only if he/she leaves the place of registration for longer than a specified
7 We use 3-year averages between 1990 1992/2000 2002 for EDU, PCGDP, UNEMP and
NUMSCHOOL to diffuse potential passing fluctuation in 1990/2000.
8 Junior high school represents junior secondary schools; high school includes senior secondary, spe-
cialized secondary and vocational schools; college covers junior college, college and graduate schools.
9 In the 2000 census, the relevant questions were asked in long form, with a sampling ratio of 9.5
percent.
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minimum period of time.10 We handle numbers of migrants categorized by educa-
tional levels, namely junior high school, high school and college,11 and define
migration rates as the ratio of numbers of migrants to working-age population not
in-school with respective educational backgrounds 5years ago, Note that we avoid
a simultaneity bias and clarify the causality between prospects of migration and
new school attendance by employing a flow base indicator of new human capital for-
mation (EDU) in the successive years of migration on the left-hand side of the equa-
tion. GDP per capita and the unemployment rate reflect economic conditions, while
the number of schools per unit of land area indicates the accessibility to school. We
estimate Equation (1) using OLS, the random effects model and the fixed effects
model.12 As unobserved province effects may or may not be correlated with explan-
atory variables, we apply Hausman’s test and report the estimates that pass this test.
Data are from population censuses conducted in 1990 and 2000, the China Statisti-
cal Yearbook (NBS, various years), Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials
on Fifty Years of New China (NBS, 1999) and the China Population Statistics Year-
book (NBS, various years). All variables are in natural logarithms. Table 3 defines all
the variables. Table 4 summarizes the statistics.
The estimates, reported in Table 5, support the presence of human capital incen-
tive and disincentive effects.13 We estimate the effects on school enrollments for
three education categories as a result of the gross outflow migration of individuals
with diverse levels of education: (i) all levels equal to or higher than the corre-
sponding level of education attained (e.g. high school and college) and lower level
of education attained (e.g. junior high school and below); (ii) the corresponding
level of education attained itself (e.g. high school); and (iii) the corresponding
level of education attained (e.g. high school) and one level lower (e.g. junior high
school).14 We obtain statistically significant estimates of β1, ranging from 0.378 to
10 This minimum time period is 1 year in the 1990 census but it is reduced to 6 months in the 2000
census. Therefore, the number of migrants in 1990 appears to be understated if we follow the definition
in the 2000 census.
11 We categorize those who have completed junior secondary schools under ‘junior high school’,
those who have completed senior secondary and specialized secondary schools under ‘high school’
and those who have completed junior colleges, colleges and graduate schools under ‘college’.
12 We are aware of possible unobserved province effects (γ). For instance, if people in a province
place higher value on education than in other provinces, education attainment will be positively corre-
lated with the human capital stock in year t, regardless of the migration prospect. However, when the
Chinese Government reduces barriers to migration, the educated are more likely to migrate, which
could statistically lead to a positive correlation between MIGO and the EDU.
13 The effects of domestic migration on human capital formation for a few main destination prov-
inces such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong can be quite different from those for inland provinces,
the main source provinces of domestic migration in China. Therefore,we re-run the regressions with the
data excluding Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong (results are available upon request). The signs and
statistical significances of the estimates, particularly the ones for the migration rates by category
(our main interest in the empirical analysis), are shown to be robust.
14 We avoid including migration rates of all the degree levels taking into account the
multicollinearity problem. Migration rates in adjacent educational categories tend to be highly
correlated.
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MIGi MIGO Number of all migrants from province i to other
provinces within the previous 5 years (1985–1990/
1995–2000)/(Population in province i in 1990/2000
+ Number of all net outflow migrants in 1985–1990/
1995–2000) (%)
MIGI Number of all migrants moving from other provinces
to province i within the previous 5 years (1985–1990/
1995–2000)/(Population in province i in 1990/2000
+ Number of all net outflow migrants in 1985–1990/
1995–2000) (%)
MIGN MIGO/MIGI
EDUCATIONMIGO Number of migrants at each educational level from
province i to other provinces within the previous
5 years (1985–1990/1995–2000)/(Number of people at
each educational level in province i in 1990/2000
+Number of net outflow migrants at each educational
level from province i in 1985–1990/1995–2000) (%)
EDUCATIONMIGI Number of migrants at each educational level from
other provinces to province i within the previous
5 years (1985–1990/1995–2000)/(Number of people
at each educational level in province i in 1990/2000
+ Number of net outflow migrants at each educational
level from province i in 1985–1990/1995–2000) (%)
EDUCATIONMIGN EDUCATIONMIGO/EDUCATIONMIGI
BMIGO EDUCATION = primary schools and below
BMIGN
JMIGO EDUCATION = junior secondary schools
JMIGN
HMIGO EDUCATION = senior secondary or specialized
secondary schoolsHMIGN
CMIGO EDUCATION = junior colleges, colleges, or graduate
schoolsCMIGN
BMIGO EDUCATION = junior secondary schools and above
BMIGN
ABOVEJ MIGO EDUCATION = junior secondary schools and above
ABOVEH MIGO EDUCATION = senior secondary or specialized
secondary schools and above
BELOWH MIGO EDUCATION = junior secondary schools and below
BELOWC MIGO EDUCATION = senior secondary or specialized
secondary schools and below
PCGDPi PCGDP GDP per capita of province i at 1990 constant prices
(yuan, in 1990–1992/2000–2002)
EDUi EDUJ Average percentage of students who enter into junior
secondary schools in province i vis-à-vis graduates of
primary schools (1990–1992/2000–2002) (%)
Continues
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0.475 for college enrollment, from 0.264 to 0.297 for high school enrollment, and
from 0.033 to 0.075 for junior high school enrollment, which suggest positive ef-
fects of gross outflow migration with equal or superior educational backgrounds
on the enrollment into the corresponding school.15 In contrast, we notice that
the estimates of β1 are mostly negative values for the impacts of gross outflow mi-
gration with inferior educational qualifications on enrollment into the correspond-
ing school, suggesting the presence of a human capital disincentive effect. In
particular, statistically significant coefficients are observed, implying the negative
effects on college enrollment (0.164) and high school enrollment (0.110).
The estimates of β1 indicate that the human capital incentive effect surpasses
the human capital disincentive effect on the whole; however, this does not
15 Enrollment into college from other provinces, which we discuss in Section II, influences the per-
centage of students who are admitted to colleges at the provincial level. In this sense, our estimates may
not correctly reflect the impact on college enrollments in native provinces. Unfortunately, this potential







Number of new enrollment in junior secondary
schools/Number of graduates from primary schools
*100
EDUH Average percentage of students who enter into senior
secondary, specialized secondary, or vocational
schools in province i vis-à-vis graduates of primary
schools (1990–1992/2000–2002) (%)
(number of new enrollment in senior secondary,
specialized secondary, or vocational schools / number
of graduate from junior secondary schools) * EDUJ
EDUC Average percentage of students who enter into
institutes of higher education in province i vis-à-vis
graduates of primary schools (1990–1992/2000–
2002) (%)
(number of new enrollment in institutes of higher
education/number of graduates from senior
secondary, specialized secondary, or vocational
schools) * EDUH
UNEMPi UEMP Average urban registered unemployment rate in
province i (1990–1992/2000–2002) (%)
NUMSCHOOLi NUMJ Number of junior secondary schools per land area (10
000 km2) (1990–1992/2000–2002)
NUMH Number of senior secondary, specialized secondary
and vocational schools per land area (10 000 km2)
(1990–1992/2000–2002)
NUMC Number of institutes of higher education per land area
(10 000 km2) (1990–1992/2000–2002)
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necessarily mean that enhanced outflow migration was favorable for school enroll-
ment and human capital formation at the national level in China in the 1990s. The
estimated higher positive coefficients than the negative coefficients suggest that
when the outflow migration rates of the more educated and the less educated grow
at the same pace, more of those who are making decisions on school enrollments
go on to higher levels of education. Nevertheless, as is discussed in Section II,
there were imbalances in the growth of the outflow migration rates with different
educational backgrounds. The increase in the migration was unevenly inclined to-
wards high school and junior high school graduates in the 1990s, and, thus, there
may be a greater human capital disincentive effect in China. For example, the re-
gression results indicate that a 1-percent increase in the gross outflow migration
rate of those with a high school education and above (ABOVEH MIGO) increases
high school enrollment (EDUH) by 0.26 percent, and a 1-percent increase in the
gross outflow migration rate of those with a junior high school education and be-
low (BELOWH MIGO) decreases it by 0.11 percent. In contrast, from 1990 to
2000, the migration rates for high school graduates and above and junior high
school graduates and below grew from 2.46 to 3.87 percent and from 1.14 to
3.73 percent, respectively, at the national level. Then, it turns out that, even with
the greater estimate for the human capital incentive effect than the disincentive






BMIGO 29 0.798 0.379 29 1.844 1.461
BMIGN 29 1.329 1.406 29 2.763 3.826
JMIGO 29 1.750 0.865 29 4.372 4.082
JMIGN 29 1.399 1.157 29 4.411 6.591
ABOVEJ MIGO 29 2.057 0.803 29 4.269 3.560
HMIGO 29 2.170 0.999 29 3.625 2.805
HMIGN 29 1.288 0.671 29 3.320 4.863
ABOVEH MIGO 29 2.680 0.965 29 3.848 2.502
BELOWHMIGO 29 1.136 0.485 29 3.070 2.662
CMIGO 29 5.772 2.409 29 4.372 2.267
CMIGN 29 1.735 1.377 29 2.649 3.293
BELOWCMIGO 29 1.268 0.502 29 3.148 2.662
PCGDP 29 2035.273 1193.152 29 5298.984 3223.033
EDUJ 29 79.711 10.782 29 93.773 4.665
EDUH 29 37.518 12.071 29 52.760 13.954
EDUC 29 7.653 8.771 29 24.132 15.842
UEMP 29 2.532 1.008 29 3.477 0.662
NUMJ 29 184.459 169.409 29 171.832 165.728
NUMH 29 97.894 138.225 29 96.769 149.083
NUMC 29 6.590 16.002 29 6.728 14.390
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effect, enhanced outflow migration has worked against high school enrollment.
The estimates suggest that the surge of migration, particularly among the less ed-
ucated groups, has reduced high school enrollment by 3.2 percentage points.16
Our estimates also report how economic conditions and accessibility to schools
determine school enrollment. The estimates of β2 indicate that higher income is
conducive to higher advancement rates at all levels and these impacts are shown
to be greater at higher education levels. We, on the other hand, observe that unem-
ployment has an adverse effect on school enrollments, particularly into college.
Greater spatial accessibility to schools, measured by the ratio of the number of
schools to land area, has a positive effect on college enrollment only.17
The empirical results are, on the whole, consistent with our hypothesis of
migration-oriented investment and disinvestment in higher education. The esti-
mated coefficients indicate both the human capital incentive and disincentive ef-
fects of interprovincial migration of individuals with diverse educational levels.
The absolute values of estimates suggest that the human capital incentive effect
eclipses the disincentive effect in general. Nevertheless, in view of the rising mi-
gration levels among the less educated groups triggered by the regional dispar-
ities posed by the unbalanced economic growth, our results infer that China
faced more adverse effects on human capital formation than favorable effects
in the 1990s.
IV. Relative Labor Supply Effect
This section explores an alternative but not mutually exclusive path, where inter-
provincial migration changes relative labor supply of the workers with diverse ed-
ucational backgrounds, which then influences return to schooling and,
accordingly, incentives to enroll into schools. This channel can be critical in the
case of domestic migration which generally occurs on a far larger scale than inter-
national migration, while the monetary and psychological costs of migration and
uncertainty prevent full and immediate arbitrage and, thus, some disparities in the
returns to schooling across provinces persist. With respect to the case of China,
16 Since the estimate points to an increase in EDUH by 0.26 percent for a 1-percent increase in
ABOVEH MIGO, a 57.3 percent increase in ABOVEH MIGO from 2.46 percent in 1990 to 3.87
percentin 2000 implies that the human capital incentive effect is 14.9 percent throughout the 1990s.
Analogously, as the result indicates a decrease in EDUH by 0.11 percent for a 1-percent increase in
BELOWHMIGO, the human capital disincentive effectis 25.0 percent when BELOWH MIGO grows
by 227.2 percent from 1.14 percentto 3.73 percent. The human capital disincentive effect exceeds in-
centive effect by 10.1 percent, which implies a 3.2-percentage point reduction in high school enroll-
ment, when nationwide EDUH in 1990–1992 is 31.9 percent.
17 We also seek to assess the monetary cost of education by adding the ratio of tuition costs to ed-
ucational funds in all educational categories in every equation. Unfortunately, we can apply this only
for the OLS estimates of 2000 (not reported) due to lack of data, and these results confirm that the es-
timated results reported in Table 5are robust.
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there is an argument against this mechanism: that return to schoolings remained
low until mid-1990s in China as compared with peer developing countries and
transition economies (Fleisher and Wang, 2005; Fleisher et al., 2005). However,
as more firms removed wage grids in place under the centrally planned economy
in setting wages for their workers and began hiring through the market mecha-
nism, return to schooling increased in the 1990s (Li, 2003; Zhang et al., 2005).
As a result, changes in relative labor supply brought about by large-scale interpro-
vincial migration should come to be more relevant as a factor determining the in-
centive to enroll in schools in source provinces, in particular, towards 2000.
Here we focus on the net outflow migration rate, unlike the previous section
which estimated human capital incentive and disincentive effects. Net outflow mi-
gration affects the relative wages of workers with different educational qualifica-
tions. Consider a net outflow of workers in an educational category (e.g. high
school) from a province. This outflow causes an excess demand for workers of
the corresponding category (high school), and, hence, their relative wage is in-
creased. Furthermore, assuming that workers with diverse educational back-
grounds are heterogeneous and not perfect substitutes for each other, the
relative wages of workers in other educational categories (college, junior high
school and lower than junior high school) are reduced. This signifies that net out-
flow migration can potentially impact school enrollments either positively or neg-
atively: net outflow migration of those with a particular educational qualification
(high school) encourages enrollment into the corresponding school (high school)
and discourages school enrollments at higher levels (college). This mechanism is
consistent with a finding by Ramcharan (2002), who shows that through increas-
ing the skill premium, the massive inflows of European unskilled immigrants at
the turn of the 20th century engendered America’s sharp rise in human capital in-
vestment. Unlike the human capital incentive and disincentive effects of gross out-
flow migration in the previous section, net outflow migration and resultant
changes in the relative labor supply may not affect the overall rate of new human
capital formation at the national level, if individuals behave in a symmetric way
facing excess demand and supply of workers. However, it does affect the geo-
graphical distribution of human capital after a direct brain drain by altering new
human capital investment at the provincial level.
To analyze this mechanism of changes in relative labor supply caused by two-
way migration of individuals with diverse educational levels, we estimate a similar
model to Equation (1) but with the net outflow migration rate (MIGN) instead of
the gross outflow migration rate (MIGO).
EDUi;t ¼ β0 þ β1MIGN i;t˜ þ β2PCGDPi;t þ β3UNEMPi;t
þβ4NUMSCHOOLi;t þ γið Þ þ vi;t:
(2)
We investigate incentives to entering into three education categories, junior
high school, high school and college, separately. We estimate the effects on school
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enrollment at each of these three education categories (e.g. high school) brought
about by the net outflow migration of individuals with diverse educational back-
grounds in the following three cases: (i) corresponding level of education itself
(high school), (ii) corresponding level of education (high school) and one level
below (junior high school),18 and (iii) all the levels of education.
The estimates in Table 6 indicate both positive and negative impacts of net out-
flow migration on enrollments into schools at three different levels. It is shown
that net outflow of migrants with a college education, a high school education
and a junior high school education, respectively, enhances new human capital for-
mation at the corresponding levels, and, thereby, mitigates the direct brain drain
effects. Furthermore, we observe that a net outflow of migrants with a junior high
school education deters high school enrollments. This also mitigates the direct
brain drain of junior high school graduates, but it does so by discouraging new hu-
man capital investment in a higher category.
V. Conclusions
This paper examines the impact of interprovincial migration of individuals with
diverse educational levels on the creation of human capital in source provinces
in China. Unlike international migration, interprovincial migration can be a ‘zero
sum game’ at the national level: simply transferring human capital embodied in
migrants from one province to the other, if migration does not affect incentive
for new human capital formation. However, this does not hold when we take into
account the possibility that decisions on human capital investment are endogenous
to the prospects and realizations of migration. Given the rapid increase in the mo-
bility of workers in China in the 1990s and the varied prospects of migration
based on educational background, provinces may have played a ‘positive or neg-
ative sum game’ rather than a ‘zero sum game’.
We identify both human capital incentive and disincentive effects of gross out-
flow migration: better prospects of successful migration for those with higher ed-
ucational backgrounds encourages residents to go on to enroll in higher education
levels; increased opportunity cost of higher education induces people to hold off
seeking higher levels of education when it is easier to migrate out to advanced re-
gions with less educational achievements. Moreover, the absolute values of esti-
mates suggest that the human capital incentive effect eclipses the disincentive
18 We, in particular, focus on the category one level below, because the incentive to attend an edu-
cational institution (high school) is naturally considered to be stronger for those who were to finish at
an institution one level below (junior high school) without the positive impact on the relative wages
than for those who were to finish their education at a much lower level (primary school). In addition,
assuming that workers at closer educational levels are more substitutable, wages for workers at those
levels would be less depressed (wages for those with a junior high school education would be less de-
pressed than for those with only a primary school education) as a result of net outflow migration of
workers in a given education category (high school).
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effect in general. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily indicate that better pros-
pects of migration enhanced school enrollments at the national level in China in
the 1990s. Interprovincial migration increased in the 1980s and 1990s when re-
form and opening-up policies enlarged income disparities across coastal and in-
land provinces and increased returns to schooling, which were suppressed
under the centrally planned economy. The increase in interprovincial migration
was triggered by a relaxation of residency restrictions, which first largely oc-
curred for the wealthy and the highly educated. As a result, migration rates
were much higher for college graduates in 1990, and our estimates imply that
interprovincial migration of those with higher education levels contributed to
human capital investment. However, in the 1990s, the sharp economic growth
and resultant high labor demand in coastal regions accelerated interprovincial
migration of high school and junior high school graduates despite their disad-
vantages under the hukou system. In view of our estimates, the increased mi-
gration of those with relatively lower educational backgrounds obstructed
human capital investment in the 1990s. Indeed, notwithstanding the continued
residency restrictions for high school and junior high school graduates, our re-
sults suggest that the surge in interprovincial migration on the whole has had
an adverse effect on human capital investment in the source provinces from
1990 to 2000.19
A different aspect of interprovincial migration has also been explored: massive
net outflow migration, which works as a perturbation to labor markets, can alter
incentives to pursue education by affecting return to schooling locally. Our esti-
mates support both a positive impact on enrollment into corresponding schools
and a negative impact on advancement to higher levels of education in source
provinces, which altogether mitigates the direct brain drain effect and helps reduce
the overconcentration of human capital in particular provinces.
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Appendix: Theoretical Model
A simple model is developed to sketch how prospects of migratioxn, when they
are dependent on educational backgrounds, bear upon new human capital for-
mation. This is an extension of Beine et al. (2001) but different in considering
the prospect of migration for the uneducated group explicitly. We depict opti-
mal behaviors of two-period lived agents with heterogeneous learning abilities
in determining school enrolment, which is swayed by prospects of migration. During
the youth period, heterogeneous agents have opportunities to allocate a share of time
to education, which increases their human capital levels in the adult period
disproportionately: agent-specific learning ability determines gain from education.
In the adult period, agents have chances to emigrate towhere they receive awage pre-
mium. However, uncertainty is involved in the process of migration and, in particular,
chances of successful migration hinge on educational achievement. Therefore,
forward-looking heterogeneous agents make decisions on school enrollment in their
youth period taking into account potential gains from education as well as prospects
of migration with and without education, being fully aware of their own learning
abilities.
Agents from generation t are identically endowed with human capital (hit ¼ ht)
and have opportunities to attend school in their youth period. When an agent i de-
cides to enroll in school, he/she devotes a fixed fraction of time in education (eit ¼ e).
Otherwise, no cost is incurred (eit ¼ 0). The schooling changes the agents’ human
capital levels in their adult period. Agents are heterogeneous in their learning abili-
ties (ai) which determine how agents are effective in transforming the fixed time
spent in education to human capital:
hitþ1 ¼ 1þ aieiβ
 
ht; (A1)
where 0<β<1 and ai is uniformly distributed on a probability space [
¯
a; a]. Note
that, if agent i chooses not to attend school (eit ¼ 0), the human capital level re-
mains unchanged in the adult period (hitþ1 ¼ ht).
Agents have chances to migrate from their home into an advanced exterior re-
gion in their adult period where rewards for human capital are proportionally
higher. This wage premium comes from the higher level of economic develop-
ment achieved in the destination district and, thus, is exogenous to agents’
decision-making. The reward for the human capital in the destination district with
and without schooling is given, respectively, by:
whitþ1 ¼ w 1þ aieβ
 





whitþ1 ¼ wht without schooling; eit ¼ 0
 
; (A3)
where w represents the wage premium in the advanced exterior net of any mone-
tary and non-monetary costs associated with migration (w> 1).
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If agents were free from any uncertainty in migration, all would have immi-
grated into the exterior induced by higher rewards. However, agents face uncer-
tainty, which holds the probabilities of migration smaller than the unity. The
central and local governments can place a curb on immigration through policy.
Because governments discriminate against the non-educated group in giving per-
mission, the probability of successful migration is dependent on educational back-
ground. We thus denote prospects of successful migration with and without
education by p and q, respectively (0≤ q≤ p≤ 1).
Each agent optimally determines whether to attend school or not through eval-
uating advantages and costs of education. The advantages are two folds: higher
human capital stock is available in the adult period and there are potentially
better prospects of migration, which increases the expected return to human
capital. These gains can be greater or smaller depending on the learning ability
of the agent (ai), while the cost of education is fixed (ēht). For simplicity, we
assume that agents are risk neutral and discount expected return in their adult
period by a constant rate (r). Then, for agent i, the present value of being
educated (PVe) is:
PVe ¼ 1 eð Þht þ
pw 1þ aieβ ht
1þ r þ
1 pð Þ 1þ aieβ ht
1þ r ; (A-4)
and the present value of not being educated (PVn) is
PVn ¼ ht þ qwht1þ r þ
1 qð Þht
1þ r : (A-5)
Because agent i attends school if and only if PVe ≥ PVn, the condition under
which he/she attends school is given by:
ai ≥ aE ≡
1þ rð Þe 1βð Þ  p qð Þ w 1ð Þe βð Þ
1þ p w 1ð Þ ; (A-6)
where we denote a E as the critical level of learning ability which makes an agent
indifferent between attending school or not.
Our interests are on how changes in the prospects of migration alter the incen-
tive to enroll in school, when prospects of migration are dependent on educational
backgrounds. Therefore, we suppose an intermediate case when some agents have
an incentive to enroll in school and others do not (i.e. a > aE >
¯
a). To show that
higher prospects of successful migration with schooling encourage school enroll-
ment, we derive the change in the critical level of learning ability when prospect
of migration with schooling (p) becomes marginally higher. That is, we have, for
any arbitrary q ( ≥ 0):
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∂aE
∂p
¼  w 1ð Þe
βð Þ 1þ 1þ rð Þeþ q w 1ð Þf g
1þ p w 1ð Þf g2 < 0: (A7)
A better prospect of migration for the educated group pushes up the present
value of being educated due to proportionally higher returns on the human capital
in the destination, and, thus, the critical level of learning ability is lowered. This
means that some agents in the uneducated group are now induced to attend
school. Therefore, better prospects of migration with higher educational back-
ground per se encourage new human capital formation.
Analogously to this, it is shown that better prospects of migration without
schooling discourage school enrollment. We have, for any arbitrary p ( ≥ 0):
∂aE
∂q
¼ w 1ð Þe
βð Þ
1þ p w 1ð Þ > 0: (A8)
This shows that a higher probability of successful migration for the uneducated
group pushes up the opportunity cost of education, and, thus, fewer agents come
to be induced to spend resources on human capital investment. Some of the
agents, who previously considered that it was worth paying the cost of education,
are now not willing to enroll in school, when they observe a higher chance of suc-
cessful migration without schooling. This signifies that a better prospect of migra-
tion without educational background per se discourages school enrollment.
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